Workmen\u27s Compensation Act--Employer\u27s Liability to Contribution for Subsequent Accident by Sames, Harry B.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 6 
Number 1 Volume 6, December 1931, Number 1 Article 17 
June 2014 
Workmen's Compensation Act--Employer's Liability to Contribution 
for Subsequent Accident 
Harry B. Sames 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Sames, Harry B. (1931) "Workmen's Compensation Act--Employer's Liability to Contribution for 
Subsequent Accident," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 6 : No. 1 , Article 17. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss1/17 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
number of cases 16 that the mortgagee's contract of insurance under
the mortgagee clause is not invalidated by breach of warranty by
owner or mortgagor committed before or at the time the policy
was issued, although such breach voided the policy as to the insured.
In the Hastings case, Rapallo, J., in his concurring opinion, referring
to the mortgagee clause, said:
"Although the clause might be construed so as to exempt
the mortgagees from the consequences only of acts of the
owners done after the making of the agreement, I do not
think, in view of its apparent purpose, that any such distinc-
tion was intended."
One of our foremost writers 17 on the law of insurance holds that
the mortgagee clause, making the mortgagee the payee and stipu-
lating that the insurance should not be invalidated by the mortgagor's
acts, constitutes an independent contract between mortgagee and in-
surer, and in such case, the subject matter of insurance is the mort-
gagee's insurable interest, and not the real estate; and the risk will
not be avoided by any acts of the mortgagor, whether done prior
or subsequent to, or at the time of the issuance of the policy.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is founded not only on
good law but sound reason. If it were not for the holding in the
instant case, what safeguards would a mortgagee have, if unknown
to him, a policy covering his interest could be avoided by an insurer
for misrepresentations or concealments by an owner? Surely, it
cannot be said that a mortgagee is under obligation constantly to
follow the acts of an owner so as to inform himself and the insurer
of any breach by an owner of his warranties or representations in
the policy between him and an insurer. Under a mortgagee clause,
the contract is primarily between a mortgagee and an insurer, and
acts of an owner should not be allowed to vitiate or interfere with
such a contract.
HELEN L. BROTMAN.
WORI MEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-EMPLOYER's LIABILITY TO
CONTRIBUTION FOR SUBSEQUENT ACCIDENT.
The right of an employee to receive compensation from his
employer depends upon whether the injury resulted from accident
arising out of the employment. Frequently the accident results from
" Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 167 Minn. 146, 208 N. W.
816 (1926); Hanover Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. Bobn, 48 Neb. 743, 67 N. W. 774
(1896) ; Federal Land Bank v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., 187 N. C.
97, 121 S. E. 37 (1924); Fayetteville Building & Loan Assn. v. Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 105 W. Va. 147, 141 S. E. 634 (1928).172 JoYCE, INSURANCE (1918) §2795.
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a previous accident which occurred in a prior employment. In such
cases it is necessary to determine which employer shall make the
compensation.
In a recent New York case, Matter of Anderson v. Babcock &
Co.,1 claimant while in the employ of Carl Pierleoni fell from
a scaffold striking his left hip on the ground, fracturing one of the
pelvic bones. Thereafter X-ray reports showed'a good union and
healing of the fracture. A few months later he obtained employ-
ment with Babcock & Wilson Company. About nine months after
the first accident, while lifting a heavy timber with several workmen
the partly united bone broke again. Held, on the evidence the
present disability exists by reason of the two accidents and the com-
pensation should be equally apportioned between the two insurers.
This holding was achieved by reasoning that the second accident
would not have happened had it not been for the first injury, but
it was immediately due to the strain caused by heavy lifting. This
reasoning is sound. In the ordinary course of events a fractured
pelvic bone does not result from the strain of lifting a heavy object.
In this case claimant's subsequent injury was made worse and ag-
gravated by the original injury. To quote Pound, J., "Unjust it
is that the first insurer should bear the entire liability when the
second accident was related in large measure to the first. No less
unjust it is that the first insurer should bear the entire liability if it
appears that without the second accident an earlier recovery might
have been had." 'a
In the Matter of Phillips v. Holmes Express Co.,2 the first
insurer was compelled to bear the entire liability. Claimant suffered
a fracture of his arm while cranking an automobile. About four
months thereafter while engaged in the same occupation the fracture
parted again. It was held that there was no evidence of an accident
on the second occasion, except that the condition caused by the first
accident was made worse. There was only one accident-the one
in May. If he had not fractured his arm then he would not have
sustained the injury in September. This case was correctly decided.
A casual relationship was shown to have existed between the orig-
inal and the subsequent accident. The present disability exists by
reason of the first accident. The first insurer was justly compelled
to bear the entire liability.
In contrast to the cases cited above, in Matter of Blackley v.
Niagara Roofing Co.,3 the second insurer bore the entire liability.
Claimant suffered a fracture of the, breast bone in 1922, receiving
'256 N. Y. 146, 175 N. E. 654 (1931).
'a Ibid. at 149, 175 N. E. at 655.
' Matter of Phillips v. Holmes Express Co., 229 N. Y. 527, 129 N. E 901
(1920). See Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 562 (3rd Dept. 1926).
'Matter of Blackley v. Niagara Roofing Co., 225 App. Div. 432, 233 N. Y.
Supp. 376 (3rd Dept. 1929).
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compensation therefor. Later while in the employ of another, a
slip as he was holding a heavy weight resulted in a fracture of the
breast bone. The prior accident was held to have had no relation
to the present one, which was caused by slipping. Here there were
two accidents. Each was separate and unconnected with the other.
The slip could, and did, of itself cause such an accident while one
was holding a heavy weight.
From the foregoing it is deduced that: (A) if a casual rela-
tionship exists between the first and second accidents, the first em-
ployer is liable. (B) If the second accident is separate and inde-
pendent of the first then the second employer is liable. (C) When
there are two distinct accidents, but the subsequent one is aggra-
vated by the original one, then both employers become equally liable
and the compensation will be apportioned between them. These
rules are just and equitable. They have arisen to satisfy the re-
quirements of that great piece of paternal legislation, the Workmen's
Compensation Law, which seeks to alleviate and soften our "harsh
common law rules giving the master such defenses as the fellow
servant rule and others furnishing just ground for the charge of
class selfishness." 4 The liability for compensation is placed upon
the employer under whom the accident occurs. This is the motivat-
ing purpose behind the Act. The above rules give power and
expression to the motive.
HARRY B. SAMES.
CRIMINAL INTENT GENERALLY AND AS APPLIED TO CRIMES M1ALA
IN SE AND CRIMES MALA PROHIBITA.
Criminal intent and criminal acts, as well as the laws governing
attempts to commit crimes, have been discussed and analyzed in
numerous treatises and periodicals by contemporary legal writers.
And yet it would seem that that most elusive term "criminal intent"
is still beyond explanation.
We say in discussing a case such as State v. White 2 where the
defendant was found guilty of beating a drum within the compact
part of the town, contrary to the provisions of the statute, that the
criminal intention is to be inferred from the criminal act. On the
other hand, we say that in larceny the prosecution must establish both
the criminal intent and the criminal act to prove its case.3 At the
'EDGAR, LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1927) §58 at p. 41.
'CLARK, CRimINAL LAW (3d ed. 1915); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, In-
tention, and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917) 26 YALE L. .. 645; Beale,
Criininal Attempts (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 491.
268 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (1891).
'People v. Jackson, 8 Barb. 637 (N. Y. 1850).
